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Abstract
Greater human longevity is one of the biggest achievements of medicine. Timely 
medical interventions save countless human lives. But some of them, especially 
those undertaken in the face of imminent death, often generate serious ethical 
dilemmas. After reaching a certain critical point, the otherwise welcomed and blessed 
possibilities of prolonging life sometimes degenerate into a painful prolongation of 
dying. A spontaneous moral intuition, as well as a more balanced, careful ethical 
reflection – for which human life constitutes the highest value – permits withdrawal 
of ineffective therapy. But just what are the criteria for making that crucial decision to 
terminate a medical therapy? How does one define them? The article opens with the 
overview of terminology applied to medical interventions that fall into the category of 
inadequate treatment, both from the perspective of medical futility ( futile treatment), 
the standpoint of the physician (overzealous treatment) and the actual suffering of 
the patient (burdensome treatment). It then examines the criteria for the termination 
of treatment, among which the prognosis of imminent death and disagreements over 
the extent of the basic medical care play crucial roles. The final parts of the article 
focus on some additional, though by no means less important, issues relating to end 
of life, like the truth at the sickbed, patient’s advance decision concerning the extent 
of medical interventions he is willing to accept and the physician’s conscience clause.
Keywords
Dying, futile treatment, overzealous therapy, basic care, conscience clause, advance 
decision, truth at the sickbed.
What are the limits of medicine? How long should one keep on trying to 
overcome an illness, his own or that of others? The debate on the meaning of 
futility and related operational criteria is still in its infancy; however, its history 
reaches back to medical antiquity. Even Hippocrates, otherwise known for his 
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outstanding respect for human life, cautioned his colleagues against visiting 
incurably ill patients1. Though, to tell the truth, he advised this more out of 
fear of compromising their reputation, or being accused of causing their death, 
than out of concern to spare them painful or uncertain remedies.
Things have changed over the centuries, but the ancient dilemma about 
‘when to stop’ continues to perplex medical practitioners and patients alike 
perhaps even more than in Hippocrates’ times. The rationale, legitimacy and 
ethical value of the old belief that physicians should employ every available 
means and do everything they can to save their patients’ lives is being seriously 
questioned. Modern medicine can save and prolong lives but it can also prolong 
suffering and dying. Medical ethicists, today, pay a lot of attention to the right 
of the patients to participate in the decision-making processes concerning 
their treatment.
Before attempting to sort out viable criteria for the termination of futile 
medical treatment, ethical controversies surrounding the provision of basic 
medical care and the problem of therapeutic obstinacy, we must take stock of 
the relevant terminology.
1. Problems with definitions
There are great number of expressions attached to medical interventions that 
fall into the category of inadequate treatment, and almost as many definitions of 
the latter. Nonetheless, all definitions take into account professional expertise, 
available means and prospects of recovery. What they differ in is the prominence 
they give to any of these factors and the philosophical and ethical context in 
which they operate when employed in the assessment of the patient’s concrete 
medical state.
1.1. Futile therapy
The first group of expressions under our survey focuses on one of the 
most important objectives of medical interventions, i.e. efficiency. It includes 
1  Cf. U. Benzenhöfer, Euthanasie und Sterbehilfe in Geschichte und Gegenwart, München, 
Verlag C. H. Beck, 1999, p. 37.
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pronouncements like futile therapy, therapeutic futility2, contraindicated treatment 
or pointless treatment3. They imply the evaluation of the concrete medical 
intervention in terms of its capacity for achieving intended good, weighed against 
its potential for inflicting harm. The practice of evaluating potential effects 
of medical interventions has a long history. Traditional distinction between 
ordinary and extraordinary forms of medical treatment – reaching back to the 
times of Pope Pius XII – though still in use, could not keep pace with the rapid 
development of medicine in recent decades and had to be supplemented with 
the distinction between proportional and disproportional ones.
The estimation of medical reasons behind intended procedures, though 
indispensable for a promising prescription, seems insufficient. It needs to be 
appended with the holistic evaluation of the well-being of the patient, done by 
his physician(s) and himself. A confrontation between opposite conclusions, 
based on subjective sets of values of involved parties, may be sometimes 
inevitable. Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress say that: “This situation 
of competing conception and ambiguity suggests that we should generally avoid 
the term futility in favour of more precise language”4.
1.2. Obstinate therapy
The second group of expressions contain terms like therapeutic obstinacy5, 
aggressive medical treatment6, overzealous treatment7 and therapeutic 
overzealousness. They indicate the maximisation of efforts and the use of full 
array of available medical means, regardless of their healing potential. The whole 
attention is on the physician, to the detriment of the patient’s actual state and 
needs. Such overzealousness is ethically reprehensible and drained of empathy.
Therapeutic overzealousness and therapeutic obstinacy may owe their 
strength to the mistaken notion that the physician has the obligation to initiate 
a medical intervention and continue it no matter what. It may be fuelled by 
2  In contrast to the above-mentioned expressions, the idea of futility makes a very rare appearance 
in the documents of the Catholic Church.
3  T. L. Beauchamp, J. F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed., New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2013, p. 169–170.
4  T. L. Beauchamp, J. F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, p. 170.
5  Concluding Document, in: J. de Dios Vial Correa, E. Sgreccia (ed.), The Dignity of the Dying 
Person, Città del Vaticano 2000, p. 25.
6  John Paul II., Evangelium vitae 65.
7  Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2278.
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the fear of falling victim to accusations of failing in his duties and breaching 
the medical ethos if he chooses otherwise. At other times it can be caused by 
the physician’s desire to sustain his patient’s hope in recovery, to make the 
patient believe that his situation cannot be so desperate if they continue his 
treatment. Such attitudes are harmful to both physicians and patients. Physician 
must see and care for the whole human person, not only this or that part of his 
biological organism that needs attention. He must accept the truth that man 
is a vulnerable and finite creature. He cannot treat the death of his patient as 
his personal failure, but as the end of the last stage of his patient’s life. When 
he is not able to impede it any longer, he should accept it. One of the essential 
tasks of the physician is to recognise the time when continuing treatment yields 
only additional and unnecessary suffering to his patient, with no prospect of 
recovery. When this moment arrives, his professional and ethical call to fight 
for the life and health of his patient as best as he can ought to give way to the 
compassionate accompaniment and alleviation of patient’s pain and despair in 
the face of the approaching death.
1.3. Exhausting therapy
The third and the last group of expressions describe the effects of the therapeutic 
procedures that are particularly exhausting, exasperating8, or burdensome. 
Patient discomfort and pain must be measured against the desired outcomes. 
In many cases, for instance in terminal illness, the prescribed therapies and 
procedures, though extremely burdensome and exhausting, are necessary. In 
other cases, however, they are clearly not.
2. Criteria for the termination of treatment
Among the criteria that have to be met in order to make treatment decisions, 
including withholding or withdrawing treatment, are the following: the objective 
assessment of the efficacy of the medical intervention; due proportion between 
the means employed and the end pursued; subjective attitude to the medical 
intervention on the part of the physician and the patient.
8  Address of John Paul II to the World Organization of Gastro-Enterology, 23 March 
2002, 2, in: http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2002/march/documents/hf_ jp-
ii_spe_20020323_congr-gastroenterologia.html (30.06.2015).
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2.1. Efficacy and proportionality of medical interventions
The most important elements in the above mentioned definitions are the 
principles of efficacy and proportionality. Efficacy is the ability of an intervention 
to produce the desired, beneficial and clinically measurable effect. The 
crucial factor here is: what can be reasonably expected? Only a fully qualified 
physician is entitled to make such judgement. The decision-making process 
would be compromised if the principle of efficacy were not accompanied by 
the principle of proportionality, which seeks to determine the quantitative 
relation between the proposed means and the reasonably expected outcomes. 
Proportionality judgement should be grounded not only on the objective, clinical 
condition of the patient, but on the entire state of his affairs. What should be 
taken into account is not just the medical efficacy, but – as Maurizio Calipari 
puts it – global efficacy, which seeks “(…) the attainment of salutary effects 
that prove to be really significant for the life of the patient, according to his 
personal assessment, in the complex context of his existence and based on the 
axiological scale he has adopted”9.
In order to establish whether a planned intervention is proportional or 
disproportional to the expected results, the following factors should be considered: 
availability; technical set-up; the accuracy of the prognosis; potential risks; costs; 
and availability of alternative treatment10. The distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary means should take into account the following: the effort 
required to obtain the proposed means; alleviation of pain; financial and other 
burdens to the patient and his family; anxiety; expected outcomes; and the 
patient’s opinion on the risk involved, based on his own hierarchy of values11.
Calipari maintains that the application of means that are both proportional 
and ordinary is, in principle, morally obligatory. If they are proportional, but 
extraordinary, their application is morally optional, conditional on concrete 
circumstances. In the latter case, other factors must be considered too, for 
instance the patient’s moral obligations towards other people and God. The 
application of means that are ordinary but disproportional is, in principle, 
9  In E. Sgreccia, Personalist Bioethics. Foundations and Applications, Philadelphia NCBC 
2012, p. 685. Cf. M. Calipari. The principle of Ethical Adequacy in the Use of Means of Preserving 
Life: Between Therapeutic Excess and Abandonment of the Patient, in: Alongside the Incurably Sick 
and Dying Person: Ethical and Practical Apsects, E. Scgreccia, J. Laffitte (ed.), Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, Vatican City 1999, s. p. 165.
10  M. Calipari, The Principle of Ethical Adequacy, p. 162–167.
11  M. Calipari, The principle of Ethical Adequacy, p. 167–171.
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forbidden; unless the patient needs more time to fulfil some other, grave moral 
obligations he may have. The application of means that are both disproportional 
and extraordinary should never be allowed12.
Accurate assessment of efficacy and proportionality of a medical intervention 
can be extremely difficult. In early 2015, a two-year-old Polish boy in the severe 
hypothermic state, with his body temperature at the unbelievable low level of 
12°C, was admitted to the children’s hospital in Kraków, Poland. Professor 
Skalski, a heart surgeon at the hospital, said: “In every practical sense, it was 
a corpse. When you see a patient whose entire nervous system is apparently shut 
down, with no neurological reflexes of any kind, no blood circulation and no 
spontaneous respiration, you have a full right to pronounce him dead. In such 
cases, it would be a near profanation if you proceeded with the resuscitation. But 
in this particular case, this little child still had a chance to survive”13. And he 
did! Dr Skalski added that the key reasons for his decision to apply resuscitation 
were his professional knowledge on hypothermia and the assessment of the 
patient’s chances of survival. Thanks to the dedication, professionalism and 
sustained efforts of the rehabilitation team in the hospital, the boy was brought 
back from deep hypothermia and restored to health.
2.2. Approaching death
Therapeutic obstinacy has a tendency to manifest itself in especially acute 
forms in the final stages of terminal illness. Problems surrounding such 
situations are obvious for all to see. The accuracy of the prognosis in any given 
case may be – and often is – challenged. Definitions of death currently in use 
are problematic. Criteria for determining the moment of death are riddled 
with problems14. For the lack of space it must suffice for our present purpose 
to say that dying and death is a process rather than a single, identifiable event. 
Having said that, however, it would be unreasonable to summarily dismiss the 
12  M. Calipari, The principle of Ethical Adequacy, p. 172–175. See also E. Sgreccia, Personalist 
Bioethics, p. 686; B. Chyrowicz, Bioetyka – anatomia sporu, Kraków, Znak 2015, p. 317–318: “When 
the forgoing of treatment is dictated neither by futility, nor disproportionality, it is nothing else but 
a passive euthanasia”.
13  For more on prof. Skalski’s motives for proceeding with the treatment of the boy, see J. Skalski, 
J. Bątkiewicz-Brożek, Mam odwagę mówić o cudzie [I am not afraid to talk about the miracle], 
Kraków, Znak 2015, p. 208ff.
14  Cf. N. Feinendegen, G. Höver (Ed.), Der Hirntod – Ein “zweites Fenster” auf den Tod des 
Menschen? Zum Neuansatz in der Debatte um das neurologische Kriterium durch den US-Bioethikrat, 
Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2013.
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professional capabilities of physicians to assert the certainty of the diagnosis 
and make realistic prognosis of improvement or deterioration, sufficient for 
a well-informed and considered decision on any given course of action.
Euthanasia is a deliberate medical intervention, undertaken with the express 
purpose of ending a life15. The alternative is not, however, keeping the person 
alive at whatever cost and by whatever means. Arriving at the accurate assessment 
of the proportionality of the medical means employed seems somehow easier 
in the situation of impending death. The reason for it is that it is being done in 
a different therapeutic context. Intensive care in such cases would have been 
severely limited, or terminated altogether, and conventional medical treatment 
replaced by the palliative care. The word palliative comes from late Medieval 
Latin word paliatus (cloaked). It refers to the holistic care for people with serious 
illness, which includes compassionate and loving accompaniment. In palliative 
care, the efficacy of medical interventions recedes into the background, and 
gives way to the concern for the general well-being of the patient. According to 
G. Virt, palliative care absorbs the medical knowledge and capacities, physical, 
mental and pastoral care, social work, physiotherapy, ergotherapy and – if 
needed – other fields of human knowledge16.
Therapeutic obstinacy may show itself in other circumstances, too. In the 
context of the comprehensive assessment of the rationale behind any given 
therapy, every futile therapy is obstinate. But not every obstinate therapy is 
necessarily futile. To illustrate this point, let us consider a therapy that may 
produce the desired, clinically measurable therapeutic effect, for instance, 
chemotherapy. Its beneficial effects might be real, but short-lived, paid for with 
great suffering of the patient17. Should the healthcare providers continue the 
treatment if the previous chemotherapy cycles were very painful and have not 
so far combatted the illness?
Decision-making processes in such circumstances are very hard indeed. 
Sooner or later, their participants must face the so-called quality-of-life issue. 
The term may be understood in two different ways. Usually, it is taken to mean 
that the patient does not suffer excessive or unnecessary physical pain and is 
15  A short summary of catholic moral teaching on euthanasia cf. E. Sgreccia, Personalist 
Bioethics, p. 679–683.
16  See G. Virt, Leben bis zum Ende. Zur Ethik des Sterbens und des Todes, Innsbruck-Wien, 
Tyrolia 1998, p. 42.
17  B. Chyrowicz, Bioetyka. Anatomia sporu, Kraków, Znak 2015, p. 313.
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able to integrate his treatment into his life, without undue disturbance of his 
other daily activities and interests. Another way of evaluating the quality of life 
is concerned primarily with the anthropological context of man, and unilaterally 
concentrated on the autonomy of the individual person. This understanding 
of the term refers to the subjective boundaries, indicating the absence of the 
rationale for the continuation of one’s life.
The concept of the quality of life always implies the assessment of its 
value. For those who confess the absolute sanctity of human life, it will never 
hit the zero value (not to mention the negative value, as some advocates of 
euthanasia propose). Where life as such has no separate, distinct value, but only 
an instrumental one, the obligation of its protection depends on whether the 
patient himself considers it worth protecting. The concept of the quality of life 
comes here to the foreground and becomes the primary ethical consideration 
when it comes to making a life-and-death decision at the end of one’s life18.
It would be difficult to accept the simple, instrumental assessment of 
human life in the context of the personalistic ethics. In order to avoid a possible 
misunderstanding, it is important to stress that the conviction about the 
fundamental value of life does not have to be connected to vitalism. Keeping 
the patient alive, whether young or old, cannot be regarded as the end in itself. It 
cannot be the only factor in favour of or against a possible medical intervention 
in a given situation. Life must be protected, true. But not as an abstract, an idea 
or a concept, but always as concrete life belonging to concrete human being. 
The assessment of proportionality of medical intervention takes into account 
the general well-being of patient, not just its efficacy.
2.3. Costs
Nonmedical factors, such as financial costs of medical interventions, must 
also be taken into account when making the assessments of their proportionality. 
Consideration of cost as the most important ethical criterion for the initiation 
or withdrawal of therapy is characteristic to the utilitarian ethical concepts. 
This is not so in the personalistic concepts of man. Respect for human life 
makes it impossible to think about it in terms of gains and losses. The issue 
of costs is taken into account, too, but only as one of the many elements in 
the ethical assessment of medical interventions. When the available financial 
18  Cf. E. Schockenhoff, Ethik des Lebens. Grundlagen und neue Herausforderungen, Freiburg-
Basel-Wien, Herder 2009, p. 536.
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and technical means are scarce, the necessity of considering the cost can be 
greater. Needless to say, a lot depends on the entire local healthcare system. 
If the cost involved is so high that it can ruin the patient’s family, or severely 
restrict other patients’ access to healthcare, whereas the expected beneficial 
outcome is slight, then the rationale for going ahead with the planned therapy 
is no longer valid. In such situations refraining from it is morally acceptable19.
3. Disagreements over the provision of basic medical care
The above-mentioned distinctions influence the extent of the provision 
of basic medical care, i.e. medical activities concerning the palliative care. 
Whereas medical interventions aim at combatting the illness and abnormal 
behaviour of the organism, basic medical care is limited to the provision of 
the optimal available means necessary to sustain life. It includes provision of 
food and fluids, lessening the discomfort, sustaining stable body temperature, 
personal hygiene, etc. It is often the same as, or similar to, the care of infants.
The most controversial issues are those that surround the use of life support 
systems, especially mechanical ventilators, used in the respiratory failure 
(sometimes colloquially called “respirators”) and feeding tubes for artificial 
nutrition and hydration (ANH). What usually sparks off a major dispute is not 
whether to turn the system on or not, but when to turn it off. Participants engage 
each other with very tough questions: Can both these procedures be considered 
as therapeutic? What if they turn out disproportional and extraordinary? Can 
they be then aborted, in accordance with the principle that every medical 
intervention that is not obligatory may be terminated?20 Or, do they rather 
belong to the category of basic medical care? If so, should they be regarded as 
always proportional and obligatory?
Let us examine the arguments for and against the use of mechanical 
ventilators first. Some ethicists argue that it can be withdrawn if the patient 
has no chance to recover spontaneous breathing, even if doing so can cause his 
death. They maintain that the mechanical ventilator is there to relieve patient’s 
19  Cf. P. Aszyk, Granice leczenia. Etyczny problem odstąpienia od interwencji medycznych, 
Warszawa, Rhetos 2006, p. 150–155.
20  “The criteria that carry enough weight for the termination of treatment are, from the ethical 
point of view, equally valid for the gradual withdrawal of treatment or, if this proves impossible, 
for the definitive end of treatment”. E. Schockenhoff, Ethik des Lebens, p. 383.
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problems with breathing, not to replace his respiratory system for good. When 
you remove the ventilator, you don’t cause death, they say. You only remove 
the artificial obstacle to death, which was coming anyway21.
Other ethicists insist that the stabilisation of the organism, brought about 
by the ventilator, creates a wholly new ethical situation, in which the two 
procedures, switching the ventilator on or off, are not the same. They stress the 
fact that the direct, immediate result of the withdrawal of artificial ventilation 
is cutting off the supply of the oxygen, its rapid depletion in the organism, and 
imminent death. A physician who undertakes such procedure puts himself into 
a very grave ethical conflict22.
The provision of artificial nutrition and hydration is a little bit different. 
Regular supply of nutrients and fluids is necessary for life. Unlike artificial 
ventilation, artificial nutrition and hydration is neither technically complicated, 
nor particularly painful or costly. It is relatively easy to reach a consensus on 
the natural provision of nutrition and hydration. For as long as the patient is able 
to ingest food and fluids, it is the positive duty of medical personnel, or family 
members, to provide it. This obligation ceases when the intake of nutrients and 
fluids fails to achieve its natural goal and is not absorbed by the organism, or 
results in additional suffering and discomfort. This usually occurs when death 
is imminent. It is a well-known fact that many dying persons do not manifest 
hunger or thirst. It would be difficult to proclaim that it is morally obligatory 
to make them eat and drink anyway.
The greatest controversies surround the problem of the provision of artificial 
nutrition and hydration to patients who are not terminally ill, for example, the 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) patients. Clinicians disagree on the likelihood 
of such patients regaining consciousness. Some maintain that it is highly 
improbable. Others cite examples of patients regaining cognitive functions 
even after remaining in the vegetative state for many years. In recent years, 
in the children’s clinic “Budzik” in Warsaw (in free translation: The Wake-up 
Clinic), established several years ago, more than a dozen PVS children regained 
their consciousness. In each case the PVS lasted for less than a year. In general, 
the longer a person remains in the persistent vegetative state, the lesser is the 
likelihood of him ever regaining consciousness.
21  E. Schockenhoff, Ethik des Lebens, p. 391.
22  For more on this particular issue see E. Schockenhoff, Ethik des Lebens, p. 392–395.
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When then, if ever, does the obligation to feed the permanently unconscious 
cease? The question was brought to public attention with full force, very recently, 
by two cases of PVS patients: Terri Shiavo in USA and Eluana Englaro in Italy. 
Both women had their feeding tubes removed, and died shortly afterwards. Some 
considered it the termination of the obstinate therapy, because both patients 
had irreversibly lost their capacity for communication with the surrounding, 
which meant that they would never be able to lead their individual existence 
again. Others charged that what was done to these women was nothing short 
of passive euthanasia. When artificial nutrition and hydration do not cause 
additional suffering to a PVS patient and is easily tolerated by his organism, 
arguments that call it aggressive and disproportional are difficult to accept. 
Whatever the opinion on these cases, they certainly should make us aware 
that there is a very thin line between letting die and making dead, between the 
termination of obstinate therapy and passive euthanasia23.
4. Additional ethical problems concerning therapeutic obstinacy
Therapeutic obstinacy and proportionality of medical interventions give 
rise to a number of other ethical controversies, which deserve at least a cursory 
treatment here.
4.1. On the question of truth at the sickbed
How much truth can the patient endure? Not much, according to traditional, 
paternalistic approach in medicine. His capacity to tolerate bad news and 
comprehend what needs to be done to cure him is small, it was believed. 
Granted, usually a physician would conceal truth in good faith, for fear that 
it could hurt his patient. Well, truth sometimes hurts…, but deceit hurts even 
more. Nowadays, patient must be fully informed about the proposed therapy 
and agree to it. It is called: the informed consent.
23  Concerning the artificial feeding and watering of PVS patients cf. B. Chyrowicz, Biotyka. 
Anatomia sporu, p. 323–326; E. F. Diamond, A Catholic Guide To Medical Ethics. Catholic Principles 
in Clinical Practice, The Palos Park, Linacre Institut 2001, p. 126–130; W. J. Eijk, Shortening life 
through suspension or omission of life prolonging medical treatment, in: W. J. Eijk et al. (Ed.), 
Manual of Catholich Medical Ethics. Responsible Healthcare from a Cathilic Perspective, Ballarat, 
Conor Court Publishing 2010, p. 575–579; E. Schockenhoff, Ethik des Lebens, p. 395–399.
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But what about informed refusal? Should the patient be fully informed about 
his real state and the proposed withdrawal of the therapy, and agree to it, too? 
Critics of familiarising the patient with the whole truth about his diagnosis and 
prognosis argue that the most important thing for the patient, at every stage 
of his illness, is hope. He must never be deprived of it. Suppression of truth 
can actually help the patient because it keeps his hope alive. Anyway, many 
patients subconsciously do not even want to be confronted with the whole 
seriousness of their situation. Lastly, there is always an element of uncertainty 
of the diagnosis and the accuracy of the prognosis24.
None of these arguments carry enough weight to convince the advocates 
of telling the patient the whole truth. They argue that the assumption that 
the patient can know only good news cannot hold at certain stages of illness. 
Giving only evasive answers to patient’s queries, or leaving him in the dark, 
often results in patient’s seriously diminished confidence in his doctor and 
ultimately produces the opposite effect to the one intended. More often than 
not, truth revealed at the right time only confirms what the patient already 
knows or suspects. It may help him to reconstruct his life around his illness 
and give a new meaning to it.
Truth is the basis of any meaningful human communication. Concealing or 
misrepresenting the truth destroys trust and compromises further communication. 
The relationship between physicians and patients is one of the most delicate 
social relations. Society rightly expects that physicians display a high level of 
transparency and personal integrity. They should not lie to patients about their 
health, especially if the latter demand and expect reliable information. Of course, 
it does not mean an automatic, full disclosure, but rather what is relevant at any 
given time and circumstance. Telling truth at the sickbed is like administering 
medicine: it should be given in appropriate, healthy doses. Especially when the 
patient enters the terminal phase of illness. For the Christian patient, timely 
provided truth about his state can help him put his affairs in order and prepare 
himself to meet his Creator.
4.2. Advance Decision
In the western English speaking world, the term “Advance Decision” means 
a statement explaining what medical treatment the individual would not want in 
24  E. Schockenhoff, Zur Lüge Verdammt? Politik, Medien, Medizin, Justiz, Wissenschaft und 
die Ethik der Wahrheit, Herder, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 2000, p. 491–503.
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the future, should that individual lack capacity to make such a decision in the 
future. Usually, it is a written document, which the individual signs either at any 
stage of his life, not necessarily during an illness, or on admission to hospital. 
It is also sometimes called the “Living Will” or “Do Not Resuscitate”. In the 
German speaking world it is called “Patiententestament” or, more precisely, 
“Petientenverfügung”.
Many people are getting a little bit apprehensive about the technological 
progress in medicine. They are afraid that if something really bad happens to 
them, the full force of all that medical technology will come on them. They simply 
do not want to be plugged-in to all those dreadful machines. In such situations, 
the Advance Decision may be very helpful. It can be helpful to a physician, 
who may withhold the use of complex and usually very expensive equipment 
without fear of being sued by the patient’s family for negligence, and for the 
family, as it relieves them from having to make difficult and painful decisions.
The advance decision/living will statement may be a source of difficult 
ethical problems. It can contain demands that may prove totally inadequate in 
the particular situation, or outright unethical. Medical interventions that the 
patient wishes to be withheld may turn out to be neither extraordinary, nor 
disproportionate. Even if valid, should the physician carry them out to the letter, 
or readjust them according to the patient’s concrete situation?
A research on the matter, conducted in 2009 in Germany by professor Stephan 
Sahm, indicated that the healthy often expressed quite a different view on 
sickness and disability than the sick. The former usually assumed a very limited 
range of suffering and disabilities they would be willing or able to cope with. 
Many respondents who did experience serious illness or disability confessed 
that, after initial shock and periods of depression, they were much more eager to 
undergo a necessary therapy and come to terms with their impairment that they 
had thought it possible before. Only very few respondents claimed unchanged 
opinion before and after a health incident25.
The source of the greatest unease among physicians, patients and ethicists 
is the binding nature of the advance decision document, especially if it involves 
physician involvement in, for instance, an act of euthanasia. Of course, every 
person has a right to dignified death; but it does not mean that every person 
has a right to euthanasia. Even if the patient thinks that his life is not worth 
25  S. Sahm, Medizinische Entscheidungen am Lebensende. Alternativen zur Patientenverfügung, 
“Forschung Frankfurt” 2 (2007), p. 49.
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living any more, he cannot demand that his physician immediately stops all 
ordinary and proportional therapy and puts him to death without further delay.
Eberhard Schockenhoff said: “As long as the highest aim of the medical 
intervention is the well-being of the patient as the whole person, and not only 
fulfilment of his will, the physician must not shift his responsibility onto the 
written will of the patient, especially that it does not have to be, necessarily 
and unconditionally, identical with his real decision in the concrete situation”26.
From the Christian point of view, the will of the patient is morally acceptable 
only if it does not negate the fundamental value of human life, does not advance 
opinion that life in a seriously and irreversibly impaired manner is not worth 
living, and does not demand of the physician immoral acts or withdrawal of 
treatment. A Christian living will would be more like a declaration of acceptance 
of death. It may contain a wish to discontinue a therapy that, to the best available 
medical knowledge, is not likely to bring desired results and may only prolong 
suffering. Ethically acceptable content of such a document, as well as sufficient 
and adequate knowledge of the signing party, is of paramount importance.
4.3. Conscience clause
Conscience clause is a legislative provision that permits a physician to refuse 
to provide certain care related services for reasons of religion or conscience. 
For the purpose of this paper, we shall limit our inquiry to the right of the 
physician to refuse to perform or assist at euthanasia.
The idea of conscientious objection and conscience clause cannot be discussed 
in isolation from patient autonomy. Its many critics maintain that the right of 
a physician to act upon conscientious objection and refuse certain medical 
interventions directly violates patient autonomy. They argue that he is there to 
provide his patient with all available and legal services and his conscience has 
nothing to do with his job whatsoever. They may seem right; but they are not. 
Doctors are not there to fulfil patients’ personal preferences or wishes. They too 
have the right to defend their autonomy and personal and professional integrity. 
Acting on the fundamental respect for human life, they can and should refuse 
provision of medical services that are justified by arbitrary evaluations of the 
quality or value of their patient’s life, for instance in euthanasia27.
26  E. Schockenhoff, Ethik des Lebens, p. 383.
27  Cf. L. Gormallz, Personal and social responsibility in the context of the defense of human 
life: the question of cooperation in evil, in: E. Sgreccia, J. Laffitte, Christian conscience in support 
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Physician and patient may have different sets of values, convictions and 
beliefs. Sometimes, this difference may be a source of considerable tensions 
between one and the other. A physician may find it difficult to balance his 
duty to protect the life and health of his patient on the one hand, and to respect 
his right to self-determination on the other. A patient may feel being forced 
to accept what is against his conscience, but fear that his own demands and 
expectations may compromise his doctor’s moral integrity.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion are some of the most important 
affirmations of our times. Every human person has the right to act according 
to dictates of his conscience, and no one should be compelled to act against it. 
Physician may invoke the conscience clause in matters concerning fundamental 
human dignity. He may appeal to religion when it affects the basic ethical standards 
of the medical profession, like the life-and-death decisions. The fundamental 
duty of respect for human life is, of course, independent of his world view, but 
his religious convictions, or lack thereof, may enhance or diminish it. Growing 
dependence of medicine on economy and politics may produce further moral 
conflicts and trouble individual and collective conscience. Various ideologies 
are becoming ever more vocal in disseminating their views on what is ethical 
for healthcare providers and what is not28.
On 7 October 2010, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly adopted 
Resolution 1763, confirming the right of physicians to conscientious objection. 
During a debate before the vote, there was a strong pressure to restrict the 
application of the conscience clause to the private sphere of the medical 
professionals and exclude from it hospitals and other health care institutions. 
Eventually, the Resolution 1763 stressed that: “No person, hospital or institution 
shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against in any manner because 
of a refusal to perform, accommodate, assist or submit to an abortion, the 
performance of a human miscarriage, or euthanasia or any act which could 
cause the death of a human foetus or embryo, for any reason”29.
of the right to life, Citta del Vaticano, Libreria Editrice Vaticana 2008, p. 102–105.
28  For more on various aspects of conscience-based objection in health care see P. Stanisz, 
J. Pawlikowski, M. Ordon (ed.), Sprzeciw sumienia w praktyce medycznej – aspekty etyczne i prawne 
[Ethical and legal issues concerning conscience-based objection in health care], Lublin, KUL 2014.
29  http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=17909&lang=en 
(30.06.2015).
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